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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brian Robson was on probation in the 2016 case when he was charged in the 2020 case.
The State subsequently filed a motion to revoke his probation in the 2016 case.

After

Mr. Robson entered admissions to some of the alleged probation violations in the 2016 case, the
district court revoked Mr. Robson’s probation in that case and executed the underlying sentence.
Mr. Robson also pled guilty in the 2020 case to attempted grand theft, and the district court
sentenced him to serve seven years, with two years fixed.

Mr. Robson appeals, and he argues

the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and executing his sentence in the
2016 case and by imposing an excessive sentence in the 2020 case.

1

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In March 2016, the State filed a criminal complaint alleging that Mr. Robson committed
felony possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (No. 48754 R., pp.22-23.) Mr. Robson pled guilty to felony possession of a
controlled substance pursuant to a plea agreement.1 (No. 48754 R., pp.35-43.) The district court
sentenced Mr. Robson to seven years, with two years fixed, suspended for probation.2 (No.
48754 R., pp.47-51.)
In December 2016, the State filed a motion for probation violation and accompanying
report of probation violation in the 2016 case alleging that Mr. Robson had violated his probation
by: failing to report to his probation officer on three occasions, failing to obtain permission
before changing residences, using a controlled substance on four occasions, failing to submit to a
urinalysis test on two occasions, failing to complete substance abuse treatment, and failing to
“pay fines, fees, funds, surcharges and/or costs as ordered by the Court.” (No. 48754 R., pp.8592.) After Mr. Robson entered admissions to some of the alleged violations,3 the district court
entered an order reinstating Mr. Robson’s probation with the additional condition that
Mr. Robson participate in the Bridge Court specialty program. (No. 48754 R., pp.100-04.)
In August 2017, the State filed another motion for probation violation and accompanying
report of probation violation in the 2016 case. (No. 48754 R., pp.118-27.) In that motion,
Mr. Robson was alleged to have violated his probation by: failing to report to his supervising
officer on two occasions, possessing alcohol on one occasion, using a controlled substance on

1

According to the judgment of conviction, the misdemeanor paraphernalia charge was dismissed
pursuant to the plea agreement. (No. 48754 R., p.47.)
2
The district court also ordered Mr. Robson to serve one-hundred-and-twenty (120) days in the
Ada County jail, with sixty-eight days credit for time served. (No. 48754 R., p.48.)
3
See No. 48754 R., p.94.
2

seven occasions, failing to complete substance abuse treatment, failing to attend a follow up
appointment with vocational rehabilitation, and failing to “pay fines, fees, funds, surcharges
and/or costs as ordered by the Court”. (No. 48754 R., pp.118-27.) After Mr. Robson entered
admissions to some of the alleged violations in the second motion,4 the district court revoked
Mr. Robson’s probation and retained jurisdiction (a “rider”). (No. 48754 R., pp.131-33.) After
Mr. Robson successfully completed his rider, the district court entered an order reinstating his
probation. (No. 48754 R., pp.137-42.)
In September 2018, the State filed a third motion for probation violation and
accompanying report of probation violation in the 2016 case. (No. 48754 R., pp.153-60.) In the
third motion, the State alleged that Mr. Robson violated his probation by using a controlled
substance on eight occasions, associating with unapproved individuals, failing to serve two days
of discretionary jail time as directed, failing to complete a GAIN assessment, and failing to “pay
fines, fees, funds, surcharges and/or costs as ordered by the Court”. (No. 48754 R., pp.153-60.)
After Mr. Robson entered admissions to some of the alleged violations in the third motion, 5 the
district court entered an order reinstating Mr. Robson’s probation with the additional condition
that Mr. Robson “enter into, fully comply with, and successfully complete the Ada County Drug
Court program.” (No. 48754 R., pp.174-78.) Mr. Robson was subsequently discharged from the
Ada County Drug Court program “for failing to adhere to Drug Court rules and regulations.”
(No. 48754 R., pp.211-13.)
In July 2019, the State filed a fourth motion for bench warrant for probation violation,
which alleged that Mr. Robson violated the terms of his probation by committing the crime of
resisting and/or obstructing an officer, failing to successfully complete Ada County Drug Court,
4
5

See No. 48754 R., p.129.
See No. 48754 R., p.163.
3

and failing to “pay fines, fees, funds, surcharges and/or costs as ordered by the Court.” (No.
48754 R., pp.201-05.) After Mr. Robson entered admissions to some of the alleged violations in
the fourth motion,6 Mr. Robson requested a furlough so that he could enter an inpatient treatment
program at Moonlight Mountain Recovery. (No. 48754 R., pp.215-36.) The district court
subsequently entered an order reinstating Mr. Robson’s probation after Mr. Robson successfully
completed his inpatient treatment program. (No. 48754 R., pp.247-51.)
In November 2020, a fifth motion for bench warrant for probation violation, as well as a
report of probation violation, was filed in the 2016 case. (No. 48754 R., pp.252-82.) The State
alleged in that motion that Mr. Robson violated the terms of his probation by failing to complete
intensive outpatient treatment, failing to attend AA/NA meetings, failing to attend Twelve Step
meetings, failing to participate in random drug testing, failing to report to his supervising officer
on six occasions, using a controlled substance on two occasions, and failing to “pay fines, fees,
funds, surcharges and/or costs as ordered by the Court.” (No. 48754 R., pp.252-82.)
In December 2020, the State filed a criminal complaint alleging that Mr. Robson had
committed two counts of burglary, one count of attempted grand theft, three counts of
commercial burglary, and four counts of petit theft. (No. 48755 R., pp.7-10.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Mr. Robson pled guilty to one count of attempted grand theft and the remaining
charges were dismissed. (No. 48755 R., pp.22-30; Tr. Vol. II,7 p.12, L.19—p.13, L.19.)

6

See No. 48754 R., p.214.
A transcript was prepared for each case now on appeal. However, the transcript prepared for
the 2016 case does not contain the entry of plea hearing in the 2020 case. Since the transcript
prepared for the 2020 case contains the hearings for the 2016 case and the entry of plea hearing
in the 2020 case, citations to the transcript will refer to the hearings contained in the 21-page
electronic document titled “Appeal Transcripts SC# 4875548754-2021 07-27-2021 10.11.42
49160034 A83F03B6-2B6D-4B2C-9670-24A4FA053FE1.” The pagination starts over for each
hearing in the transcript cited on appeal. Citations to “Tr. Vol. I” refer to the entry of admissions
hearing held on February 1, 2021. Citations to “Tr. Vol. II” refer to the entry of plea hearing
7

4

The State subsequently filed an amended motion for probation violation in the 2016 case,
which alleged the same violations from the previously filed motion as well as allegations that
Mr. Robson violated his probation by committing the law violations from the 2020 case and
additional law violations for possession of drug paraphernalia and providing false information to
law enforcement in an unrelated case.

(No. 48754 R., pp.290-308.)

Mr. Robson entered

admissions to violating the terms of his probation by failing to report to his probation officer on
six occasions, using methamphetamine on one occasion, committing the crime of attempted
grand theft in the 2020 case, and committing the crime of providing false information to law
enforcement in the unrelated case. (Tr. Vol. I, p.8, L.19—p.9, L.25.)
At the joint probation violation and disposition hearing, the State recommended that the
district court revoke Mr. Robson’s probation and execute the underlying sentence in the 2016
case. (Tr. Vol. III, p.5, Ls.17-20.) For the 2020 case, the State recommended an executed
sentence of seven years, with two years fixed. (Tr. Vol III, p.5, Ls.21-23.) Defense counsel
indicated that Mr. Robson had substance abuse treatment arranged in the community “if the
Court were to continue him on a period of probation and reinstate him.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.14,
Ls.14-18.) Defense counsel asked for the district court “not to impose a sentence greater than a
one plus four” if the Court ordered Mr. Robson to serve the sentence in the 2020 case. (Tr. Vol.
III, p.15, Ls.12-14.) Defense counsel also requested that the district court commute the sentence
in the probation violation case if the Court entered an executed sentence in the 2020 case.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.15, Ls.15-17.)
For the 2020 case, the district court ordered Mr. Robson to serve seven years, with two
years fixed, concurrent with the sentence from the 2016 case. (No. 48755 R., pp.35-37; Tr. Vol.
held on January 15, 2021. Citations to “Tr. Vol. III” refer to the joint sentencing and probation
violation disposition hearing held on April 12, 2021.
5

III, p.24, L.25—p.25, L.2.) For the 2016 case, the district court revoked Mr. Robson’s probation
and executed the underlying sentence. (No. 48754 R., pp.315-17; Tr. Vol. III, p.25, Ls.6-8.)
Mr. Robson filed a timely notice of appeal in both cases.8 (No. 48754 R., pp.318-20; No. 48755
R., pp.38-40.)

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Robson to serve seven
years, with two years fixed, for attempted grand theft?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Robson’s probation and
executed the underlying sentence in the 2016 case?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Robson To Seven Years, With
Two Years Fixed, For Attempted Grand Theft
“Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, ‘the appellant
bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.’” State v. Windom, 150
Idaho 873, 875 (2011) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
8

Mr. Robson also filed timely motions for correction or reduction of sentence pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35 motions”) in each case following the joint sentencing and disposition
hearing. (No. 48754 R., p.322; No. 48755 R., pp.41-44, 46.) The district court subsequently
denied the Rule 35 motions after determining that Mr. Robson “provided no new information
convincing the Court that the sentence should be reduced.” (No. 48754 R., p.322; No. 48755
R., pp.41-44, 46.) Since no new information was presented to the district court in the Rule 35
motions, Mr. Robson does not challenge the denial of the Rule 35 motions on appeal. Since
Mr. Robson is not contesting the ruling on the Rule 35 motions, Mr. Robson has not augmented
the clerk’s record on appeal for these cases with the briefs he filed in support of his Rule 35
motions, the State’s response to the Rule 35 motion that was filed in the 2016 case, or with a
copy of the order denying the Rule 35 motion in the 2020 case that was electronically filed on
October 4, 2021.
6

outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). In the 2020 case, Mr. Robson’s sentence
for attempted grand theft does not exceed the seven-year statutory maximum. See I.C. §§ 182408(2)(a) (fourteen-year maximum for grand theft) & 18-306(2) (punishment for attempts is
one-half of the statutory maximum). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was
unreasonable, Mr. Robson “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘[R]easonableness’” implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to the
purposes for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App.
1982).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
In the 2020 case, Mr. Robson asserts that the district court did not exercise reason, and
therefore abused its discretion, by imposing a sentence that is excessive under any reasonable
view of the facts. Specifically, Mr. Robson contends the district court should have sentenced
him to probation in light of the mitigating factors, including his mental health issues, troubled
childhood, and substance abuse issues.

7

First, Mr. Robson’s mental condition is a mitigating factor that supports leniency in
sentencing. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 not only
suggests, but requires, the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing
factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). If a defendant’s mental condition is a
significant factor, then Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the court to consider factors such as: (a)
the extent to which the defendant is mentally ill; (b) the degree of illness or defect and level of
functional impairment; (c) the prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation; (d) the availability of
treatment and level of care required; (e) any risk of danger which the defendant may create for
the public if not incarcerated, or the lack of such risk; and (f) the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the
requirements of the law at the time of the offense charged.

“The factors listed in Idaho

Code § 19–2523 provide a manner in which to evaluate the mental health information presented
to the sentencing court.” Strand, 137 Idaho at 461.
A mental health examination was ordered in Mr. Robson’s 2016 case after he entered
admissions on the first probation violation. (PSI,9 pp.67-82.) The examiner found that “[i]n
terms of neurocognitive functions, on the WAIS-IV, Mr. Robson obtains a Full Scale
Intelligence Quotient of 71, with a Verbal Comprehension score of 78, and Perceptual Reasoning
score of 69 (3rd, 7th, and 2nd percentiles, respectively).” (PSI, p.73.) The examiner noted that
“Mr. Robson is performing in the low range across Communication Skills, Daily Living Skills,
and Socialization Skills (<1st, <1st, and <1st percentiles, respectively). He requires assistance

9

Citations to the “PSI” refer to the 336-page electronic document included with the confidential
sentencing materials for the 2016 case titled “Appeal Confidential Exhibit SC#4875448755-2021
07-27-2021 10.58.44 49162289 F7C04809-4EAA-4129-B65C-2BA2156D4CC3.”
8

and/or prompts to communicate his needs, perform hygiene duties, and prepare small meals.”
(PSI, pp.73-74.)
Mr. Robson informed the presentence investigator in the 2016 case that he “was placed in
Special Education because he can’t read or spell well” and that “didn’t graduate [high school]
because he didn’t have enough credits.” (PSI, p.9.) The mental health examiner wrote in her
report that “[c]onsistent with a history of learning difficulties and participation in Special
Education throughout his academic career, Mr. Robson demonstrates impaired reading abilities
with 2nd-grade level skills (1st percentile).” (PSI, p.74.) The examiner diagnosed Mr. Robson
with “mild intellectual disability”, “bipolar II disorder”, “attention deficit/hyperactivity
disorder”, an “unspecified anxiety disorder”, “stimulant use disorder, moderate, amphetaminetype substance, in remission in a controlled environment”, “cannabis use disorder, moderate, in
remission in a controlled environment”, and “unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other
psychotic disorder (rule-out).” (PSI, pp.76-77.)
The clinical neuropsychologist that prepared the mental health examination report noted
that Mr. Robson was determined to be ineligible for a mental health court specialty program
prior to disposition on the first probation violation due to Mr. Robson’s “limited cognitive
abilities.” (PSI, p.68.) At the entry of plea hearing for the 2020 case, Mr. Robson informed the
district court that he wanted “another try at a mental health court.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.10, L.25—
p.11, L.7.)

The presentence investigation report prepared for the 2020 case noted that

Mr. Robson “was deemed inappropriate for Mental Health Court due to the belief he will need a
higher level of care than Mental Health Court can provide.”10 (PSI, p.128.)

10

Defense counsel stated at the joint disposition and sentencing hearing that Mr. Robson was
also denied the opportunity to participate in the mental health court program because
9

A Department of Health and Welfare mental health examination report was also prepared
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 prior to sentencing in the 2020 case. (PSI, pp.149-51.) In that report,
it was recommended that Mr. Robson “continue to access mental health treatment while
incarcerated and while in the community to avoid deterioration of functioning and to monitor for
any ongoing risk and/or elevation of symptoms.” (PSI, p.151.) The report also stated that
“[w]ithout some form of treatment, it is likely this Individual will continue to struggle with
symptoms and problems may increase.”

(PSI, p.151.)

At sentencing, defense counsel

recommended community supervision because a prison sentence “simply ties Mr. Robson in
with individuals who are more likely to persuade him to do things that are not in his best interest.
And I think that we come out on the backside of that with Mr. Robson in the worse spot than he
is in today.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.15, L.23—p.16, L.7.)
Mr. Robson asserts that the district court did not adequately consider his mental health as
a factor at sentencing as required under Idaho Code § 19-2523. Mr. Robson’s mental health was
a significant factor, and there were substantial concerns if Mr. Robson does not receive adequate
treatment for his mental health needs. “The sentencing court is not required to recite each of the
factors listed.” Strand, 137 Idaho at 461. However, the prison sentence imposed suggests that
the district court did not give adequate consideration to the factors listed under Idaho
Code § 19-2523. Mr. Robson’s mental condition stands in favor of mitigation and leniency in
this case.
Second, the Court of Appeals has also recognized that a defendant’s “extremely troubled
childhood is a factor that bears consideration at sentencing.” State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618,
620 (Ct. App. 2001). In the presentence investigation report prepared for the 2020 case prior to
Mr. Robson’s “cognitive impairments were too great for the program.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.13, Ls.1724.)
10

sentencing, Mr. Robson informed the investigator that his father left his family when he was
(PSI, p.130.) Mr. Robson also reported that he was frequently “made fun of
because of disabilities” when he was a child, including his mother calling him “retarded.” (PSI,
p.130.)

In the 2016 presentence investigation report, Mr. Robson’s mother stated that

Mr. Robson burned down three separate houses that his family was living in while he was a
child. (PSI, p.7.) Mr. Robson reported that “a dog bit his lip off when he was
and it had to be sewed back on, and he has had a speech impediment ever since.” (PSI, p.10.)
Mr. Robson reported that he “was picked on for his speech impediment” in school (PSI, pp.13132.) Mr. Robson’s troubled childhood stands in favor of mitigation and leniency in this case.
Third, Mr. Robson’s substance abuse issues, the impact of his substance abuse on his
behavior, and his need for treatment are strong factors in mitigation. The impact of substance
abuse on the defendant’s criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment
upon sentencing.”

State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981).

Prior to sentencing,

Mr. Robson completed a Global Appraisal of Individual Needs (“GAIN”) assessment. (PSI,
pp.138-48.) In that assessment, Mr. Robson self-reported symptoms sufficient to meet the
criteria for amphetamine use disorder severe. (PSI, p.140.) Mr. Robson also informed the
presentence investigator that he had been using “a little more than a gram” of methamphetamine
daily for about ten months prior to his arrest. (PSI, p.131.)
Despite Mr. Robson’s repeated struggles with substance abuse, the GAIN assessor noted
that Mr. Robson’s “responses indicate high motivation for treatment” and that Mr. Robson
“reported that he has quit using substances and is about 100% ready to remain abstinent.” (PSI,
p.144.) Mr. Robson has successfully completed various substance abuse programs in the past.
In 2018, Mr. Robson successfully completed the cognitive-behavioral interventions for substance

11

abuse (CBI-SA) program while on a rider. (PSI, pp.86-87.) In 2019, Mr. Robson completed an
inpatient treatment program through Moonlight Mountain Recovery.

(PSI, pp.100-25.)

Mr. Robson also completed the Ada County Sheriff’s Office Substance Abuse Program in 2019.
(PSI, pp.203-04.) At sentencing, Mr. Robson acknowledged that he has “a really bad drug
addiction”, but he informed the district court that he “will do better” if given an opportunity for
probation. (Tr. Vol. III, p.16, Ls.14-20.) Mr. Robson’s substance use issues, the impact of his
substance abuse on his behavior, and his need for treatment are strong mitigating factors that
support leniency in this case.
In sum, Mr. Robson maintains that the district court did not exercise reason at sentencing
because it failed to give adequate weight to the mitigating factors in his case. Proper
consideration of these factors supports a lesser prison sentence or probation.

Mr. Robson

submits that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Robson’s Probation And
Executed The Underlying Sentence In The 2016 Case
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant’s probation under
certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a two-step analysis to
review a probation revocation decision. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the
Court determines “whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation.” Id. Second, “[i]f
it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation,” the Court
examines “what should be the consequences of that violation.” Id. The determination of a
probation violation and the determination of the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
Here, Mr. Robson does not challenge his admissions to violating his probation. “[W]hen
a probationer admits to a direct violation of his probation agreement, no further inquiry into the
12

question is required.” State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted).
Rather, Mr. Robson submits that the district court did not exercise reason, and therefore abused
its discretion, by revoking his probation in the 2016 case.
“After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation and
pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Roy, 113 Idaho
388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). “A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned
on appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.” Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105.
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
“The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated
under proper control and supervision.” State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454 (1977). “In
determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider whether probation is meeting the
objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate protection for society.” State v. Upton,
127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). Just as is the case when reviewing the original imposition
of sentence, the appellate court will independently review the entire record, “focusing on the
objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.”
State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5, 244 P.3d 145, 149 (2010).

The court may consider the

defendant’s conduct before and during probation. Roy, 113 Idaho at 392.
Mr. Robson successfully completed his programming while participating in his rider for
the 2016 case. (PSI, pp.85-99.) Likewise, Mr. Robson successfully completed an inpatient

13

treatment program at Moonlight Mountain Recovery (“MMR”) in 2019 while on probation in the
2016 case. (PSI, pp.100-25.) In the discharge summary from his inpatient treatment program,
the program director noted that Mr. Robson “appeared stable and motivated for long term
recovery upon discharge” and that Mr. Robson “completed all treatment objective during his
time at MMR.” (PSI, pp.101-02.) Similarly, Mr. Robson completed the Ada County Sheriff’s
Office Substance Abuse Program (“SAP”) while in custody in 2019. (PSI, pp.203-04.) In the
most recent report of probation violation filed in Mr. Robson’s 2016 case, Mr. Robson’s
probation officer recommended that Mr. Robson “be screened for Ada Treatment Court” and that
Mr. Robson “be granted a Rider” if Mr. Robson was not an appropriate candidate for a specialty
court program. (No. 48754 R., p.257.)
In light of these facts, as well as the mitigating information presented in Section I of this
brief, Mr. Robson submits that the district court did not exercise reason, and thus abused its
discretion, by revoking his probation. Mr. Robson had previously demonstrated that he could
successfully complete substance abuse treatment programs. Mr. Robson informed the district
court at the joint sentencing and disposition hearing that “[t]his time around I know what I’ve
done and it’s wrong. There’s nothing that I can really say except I’m sorry and that I will do
better.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.16, Ls.18-20.) The district court should have reinstated his probation as
requested at the disposition hearing.

14

CONCLUSION
For the 2016 case, Mr. Robson respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court’s
order revoking his probation and remand his cases to the district court with an instruction that he
be sentenced to probation. For the 2020 case, Mr. Robson respectfully requests this Court reduce
his sentence as it deems appropriate. In the alternative, he respectfully requests this Court vacate
the district court’s judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 8th day of November, 2021.

/s/ Jacob L. Westerfield
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of November, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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